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[Crim. No. an5. In Bank. Dec. 26, 1961.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAWRENCE
CHRISTOPHEH. GARNER, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Extradition-Rights of Person Wroilgfully Seize d.-The power
of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact
that he was forcibly seized in another country or state and
transferred to this state by violence, force or fraud for an
olIense alleged to have been committed in this state, there
being no provision in the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States which guarantees him any protection in such
transaction.
[2a,2b] Criminal Law-Evidenee-Confessions.-Where a pretrial
confession is voluntarily made, it is admissible in evidence so
far as due process is concerned, though defendant was not
taken before a magistrate until four days after his arrest in
Arizona.
[8] Id.-Right to Pretrial Inspection of Confessions.-The right of
defendant's trial counsel in a murder ease to inspect, view,
hear or copy any and all statements of defendant in discovery
proceedings before trial extends to a joint confession given by
defendant and his codefendant. (Disapproving any contrary
inference in Schindler v. Superior Court, 161 Cal.App.2d 513
[327 P.2d 68].)
[4] leL-Right to Pretrial Inspection of Confessions.-The district
attorney is not required to seek out defendant's trial counsel
and present statements by defendant to him for inspection;
it is the duty of such counsel to go to the district attorney's
office and inspect the statements available to him there.
[5] Id. - Appeal- Harmless Error - Evidence - Confessions. Where no objection was made in thc trial court to the introduction of a tape-recorded confession on the ground that de-

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Extradition, § 44[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 421 et seq. ; Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ 477 et seq.
[3] See CaLJur.2d, Trial, § 383.
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Extradition, § 13i [2] Criminal Law,
§ 465; [3,4] Criminal Law, § 272; [5] Climinal Law, §1382(27);
[6, 7] Criminal Law, l469; [8-10, 12-14] Criminal Law, § 467;
[11] Criminal Law, § 820; [15] Criminal Law, § 189; [16] Witnesses, § 242; [17] Criminal Law, § 1075; [18] Criminal Law,
§ 1383; [19] Criminal Law, § 1377(1); [20] Criminal Law,
§ 266(1); [21] Criminal Law, § 266; [22] Homicide, § 172; [23]
Criminal Law, § 632.
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fendnnt's counsel had not been Ilft'ordcd opportunity to hear
the tape befon! trilll, where the record fOllows clearly that the
tape was not U I:\urprise to defcudant's counsel, and where defendant's handwritten confl'!;sion, which was also introduced in
evidence, contained the same mlltter as was on the tape, the
introduction of the taped confession did not result in any
prejudicial error to defendnnt.
[6J Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-There was no merit to a contention that various confessions of defendant in a murder case
were obtaincd in rcturn for favors granted or withheld at the
discretion of law enforcement officials where the record disclosed that each of the confessions received in evidence was
freely and voluntnrily made, without duress, inducement or
promise of reward.
[7] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-A. contention that an instruction
concerning tIl(' voluntariness of a confession was faulty in that
it failcd to cover the subject of implied coercion is of no
avail where tIle record does not show that any implied coercion
existed.
[8] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-A voluntary admission is not a
necessary product of an illt'gal detention.
[9] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-Though an earlier confession,
admitted in evidence, might have been found involuntary by
the jury because of delay in the arraignment, defendant was
not prejudiced where thel'e was nothing in the record to support a finding that confessions made after the arraignmcnt,
one in the presence of his wife, were influenced by the earlier
delay in bringing him before a nmgistrate and appointing
counsel to represent him.
[10] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-A showing thnt dcfendantwas
allowed to see his wife before finishing his handwl'itten confession, and thnt it was four hours after his conference with
his wife had ended before he completed the lengthy statement
and gave it to the sherifl', is insufficient to show that he gave
the statement in l'eturn for permission to see his wife.
[U] Id.-Instructions-Confessions.-An instruction that the fact
that defendant was under a.nest at the time he made a confession or an admission, was not then represented by counsel,
. was not told that any statement he might nlake could or would
be used against him, or was told that others had made statements implicating him in the crime might be considered together with other evidence bearing on the voluntariness of
defendant's ,confession would be r('le"ant only where there is
evidence showing these factors to be part of an overall pattern of coercion or other improper influence.
[12] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-Absence of defendant's counsel
at the time he freely and voluntarily makes a confession

\
\
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~'jthout threats, force, duress or promise of reward does not
of itself render the confession inadmissible and in violation
of the due process clause of the federal Constitution. Each
ease must be examined to determine if a failure to provide,
or to permit defendant to consult, counsel violated constitutional rights or otherwise impaired the voluntary character
of an admission.
[18] ld.-Evidence-Confessions.-Where a defendant who has
been apprehended and charged with a crime volunteers to make
a confession and does so outside the presence of hisattomey
with no persistent grueling on the part of interrogating omcers, his cOllstih:t.iollal rigllts have not been violated.
[14] ld.-Evidence-Confessions.-Where defendant had sent word
to the sheriff tllnt he. wanted to see him and, on the sheriff's
arrival, voluntarily gave what he tllen insisted was a tme
account of the crimes in question, this confession was not the
result of any grueling of defendant.
[15] ld.-Arraignment-Right to Counsel.-There was no denial of
due process based on denial of the right to counsel prior to
commencement of judicial process where the court complied
with Pen. Code, § 987, which provides that if defendant appears for arraignment without counsel he must be informed
by the court that it is his right to have counsel before being
arraigned and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel
and the court must assign counsel if he desires and is unable
to employ counsel.
[16] Witnesses - Impeachment - Contradiction - Rebuttal Testimony.-Where defendant in a murder case testified that he
was in Korea "fighting for his country in March of 1951" and
that he did not return to this country until January 1952, it
was proper, after he had denied on cross-examination that he
had been arrested in April 1951 in this country, to establish
on rebuttal that he hnd been arrested on both April 4th and
5th of that year.
[17] Criminal Law - Appeal- Objections-Witnesses-Cross-examination.-Defendant may not for the first time on appeal
raise objections to his cross-examination.
(18] ld.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Exclusion of Evidence.-Assuming that evidence offered on behalf of defendant in a
murder case was unproperly excluded, such error must be
disregarded on appeal where it was not prejudicial. (Const.,
art. VI, § 4%.)
[19] ld.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Witnesses-Cross-examination.-Any error in sustaining an objection to a question asked
a witness on cross-examination as to whether defendant was
permitted to make any telephone calls from the sheriff's substation to his attorney or his mother after he bad boon re-
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turned to California, which objection was apparently sustained
on the ground that the form and order of the question were
improper, was not ground for reversal where the witness thereafter, in response to questions of defendant's counsel, testified
that defendant did not request pennission to make a telephone
call and that the witness was not given the name of a certain
attorney and asked by defendant to call the attorney.
[20] Id. - Conduct of Trial- Exclusion of Witnesses. - It was
within the discretion of the trial judge in a murder ease to
permit a witness to remain in the courtroom during times when
other witnesses were testifying, notwithstanding the fact an
exclusionary order had been made.
[21] Id.-Conduct of Trial-Exclusion of Witnesses.-A court reporter can properly testify despite the fact thnt he has been in
court contrary to an exclusionary order; likewise, where no
prejudice was shown, permitting the presence of a sherifi'R
stenographer whose testimony consisted of reading notes
previously recorded by her, was within the discretion of tho
trial judge.
[22] Homicide - Instructions. - The jury was not improperly instructed in a murder ease where the record and the instructions given indicated that the jury was fully and fairly instructed on all material issues presented to it and that no
prejudicial error was committed by the trial judge in instructing the jury.
[23] Criminal Law-Argument of Counsel-Penalty Phase of Case.
-Though the district attorney in his argulllent to the jury
during the penalty hearing of a murder case discussed the
deterrent effect of the death penalty, such discussion was not
prejudicial, it being only a minor part of his argument.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Bernardino County. Archie D. Mitchell, Judge. .Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty, affirmed.
Gregory S. Stout, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Jack E. Goertzen, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent .

•

McCOMB, J.-This is an automatic appeal from a judgment
of guilty of murder in the first degree on two counts after trial
before a jury. The jury fixed the punishment at death.
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Viewed in the light most fa,'orable to the People, the record
diseloses the following facts:
On September 4, 1959, defendant, who subsequently on September 15, 1959, married his codefendant, Sandra Garner,
attended a drunken party at Clifford Red's apartment in
Inglewood, California. Included among the guests were Richard (Rick) Nowlen and Patricia (Pat) Hurley, with whom
Clifford Red, Sandra, and defendant had participated in a
robbery earlier that evening.
Defendant stayed with Rick and Pat at a motel after the
party.. He went back to Clifford Red's apartment about 11 :30
a. m. on September 5, 1959, but then left for a while, returning
about 5 p. m.
Pat and Rick then arrived at Clifford Red's apartment, and
an argument dc"eloped over the division of the proceeds of
the robbery.
Defendant and Sandra left the apartment about 6 p. m. and
returned about 8 :30 p. m. Defendant had taken Rick and
Pat's .45 and .32 caliber weapons with him. He replaced the
weapons when he and Sandra returned to the apartment.
Since the middle of August, Pat and Rick had been hiding
out from the police. During most of the time they had stayed
with Clifford Red and Sandra, but for a few days they stayed
at the home of defendant's girl friend in San Bernardino. In
each instance they had promised to pay a large sum of money
for room and board, but had failed to do so.
Defendant had had an argument at the motel with Rick that
morning, and Rick had threatened to involve defendant in
some sort of an escapade or to involve his mother and his girl
friend. Defendant then decided that there was no way out of
his relationship with Rick except to kill him and Pat.
That afternoon, September 5, 1959, he talked Rick into
agreeing to accompany him to Las Vegas with Pat and Sandra.
When they left later that evening, defendant drove the car,
Sandra was in the front seat, and Rick and Pat were in the
back seat.
They drove in a desert area toward Las Vegas. En route,
they stopped at Adelanto, in San Bernardino County. Defendant told Rick and Pat to go to sleep, and said he wanted
to get acquainted with Sandra. After a while, defendant and
Sandra got dut of the car and walked around the area. They
later took another walk so that defendant could look over the
highway and traffic conditions. WhE.'ll they returlled to the
ear, defendant remC'mu(,l'ed thE.'J'c were bottles in the back seat
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on the floorboard and decided on a plan to get possession of
Rick and Pat's pistols.
After defendant coaxru him awhil(', Riek gave 11im a pistol
fully loaded. Defendant then set up the bottles and commenced firing the weapon. He missed purposely, because he
knew Rick was watching and would get out of the car to show
him how to shoot. After emptyiIlg the pistol, defendant went
back to the car and got another clip, and Rick followed him
with the .32 caliber weapon in his possession.
Defendant continued firing the .45 caliber, and Rick fired
the .32. Both men reloaded, and defendant fired two shots,
breaking one bottle and nicking another. Defendant set up
more bottles, and Rick was standing behind him. After placing
the bottles, defendant walked toward Rick, brought up the
weapon, and fired, shooting him in the stomach. Rick fell over
backwards and dropped the weapon he had been holding.
Defendant told Rick he was sorry but there was no other way.
Rick pleaded with defendant, but defendant shot him through
the top of the head.
Defendant then awakened Pat and told her there had been
an accident and Rick had been hurt. When she ran over to
Rick, defendant followed her and shot her in the back of the
head.
A few days later defendant and Sandra fled to Mexico. The
day after they reached Mexico the automobile in which they
were driving was wrecked in an accident. Defendant reported
the matter to the federal authorities and was subsequently
called in for questioning. Later two officers from the San Bernardino Sheriff's Office, Inspector Oxnevad and Lieutena lit
Mathewson, flew to Mexico in an investigation of the murders.
After these officers contacted the Obregon Police Department
in Mexico, agents of the departmellt arrested defendant, ostensibly for investigation regarding his identification documents
and the automobile accident in "'hirh he had been involved.
During defendant's detention ill Mexico, Inspector Oxnevad
advised him that he was going to ask the Mexican authorities
to hold him pending extradition and that he would call his
office and ask for issuance of a warrant of arrest, at which
time defendant stated, "Well, I will go back with you freely
and voluntarily, I don't want to lay around in any Mexican
jails. "
The •next day defendant and Sandra were escorted by the
Mexican immigration officers across the border into Arizona.
Inspector Oxnevad and' Lieutenant Mathewson, who had pre-
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"jouRly been informed thnt defendant and Sandra were going
10 he put out of Mexico, were waiting for them there. They
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then placed the two under arrest and took them to a courthouse
in Arizona. From there tlley were returned to California.
[1] Defendant contends: First: That the trial court was
without the power to try Jti'1ll for the alleged murders beCa1tSe
of the method 1lscd by the arresting officers in bringing him to
California.
This contention is devoid of ID!'rit. It is immaterial whether
there was a compliance with the Mexican extradition laws or
Arizona laws on arrest and extradition. California follows
the federal rule relative to the trial of a defendant who has
been obtained from outside the jurisdiction of this state. The
rule is that it is immaterial whether a defendant has been
forcibly seized in another country or state and transferred to
this state by violenc!', force, or fraud for trial for an offense
ull!'ged to have been committed in this state, there being no
provision in the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States which guarantees him any protection in such transaction. UtCI' v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 443 et seq. [7 8.Ct.
225, 30 L.Ed. 421] ; Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519, 522 [72
8. Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541] ; In re Jones, 54 Cal.App. 423, 426
[201 P. 944]; 35 C.J.S. (1960) Extradition, § 47, p. 477
ct seq.)
In Frisbie v. Collins, supra, the Supreme Court of the United
States said, at page 522: "This Court has never departed from
the rule anllounced in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 444 [7
S.Ot. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421], that the power of a court to try a
perSOll for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been
brollght within the court's jurisuiction by reason of a 'forcible
nb(luetioll.' No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify
oYerrllling this lin!' of cases. They rest on the sound basis
that due process of law is satisfled when one present in court
is convicted of crime aft!'r haying bel.'n fairly apprized of the
charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with
constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in th~
Constitution that requil't's a court to permit a guilty person
rightfully cOllvicl<>d to escape justi('e because he was brought
to trial against his will."
[2a] Second: That he was not promptly arraigned and
that dl1ri1l0 thc intcI'val he madc certain confessions which
Sh011.ld not have "been received in et'idc11cc.
This cont('ntioll is devoid of merit. Defendant was arrested
on Friday, Septcmber 18, 1959, ill Arizona. He was arraigned
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in municipal court on Tuesday, September 22, 1959. Thereafter, on October 6, 1959, an indictment was returned against
him, and he ""as arraigned thereunder on October 9, 1959,
with court-appointed counsel representing him.
It is settled in this state that where, as in the instant case,
a pretrial confession is voluntarily made,· it is admissible in
evidence so far as due process is concerned. (Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Ca1.2d 8, 9 [9] et seq. [291 P.2d 929].) In
Rogers v. Superior Court, supra, the defendant had not been
taken before a magistrate until eight days after his arrest, well
beyond the 48-hour statutory maximum; but his voluntarily
made pretrial confession was nevertheless held properly received.
The record here discloses that each confession given by
defendant was freely and voluntarily given, without threats
or promises by law enforcement officers. Therefore, they were
properly received in evidence by the trial court.
Third: That there was a failure upon the part of the prosecutwn to comply with certain of the pretrial discovery orders.
This contention is also devoid of merit. Defendant argues
that a handwritten confession given by him on October 5,
1959, and a tape-recorded joint confession given by him and
his codefendant, Sandra, on October 6, 1959, "burst upon defense counsel as a complete and utter surprise."1
[8] Defendant's trial counsel was entitled to inspect,
view, hear, or copy any and all statements of defendant, and
such was the order of the trial judge in discovery proceedings
had before the trial.
This right extended to the joint confession given by defendant and his codefendant. (Ca.sk v. Superwr Court, 53 Cal.2d
72,75 [1] et seq. [346 P.2d 407] j cf. Vance v. Superi<Jr Court,
51 Cal.2d 92, 93 [1] [330 P.2d 773].) Any inference to the
contrary in Schin.dler v. Superi<Jr Court, 161 Cal.App.2d 513
[327 P.2d 68], is disapproved.
[4] The district attorney, however, was not required to
seek out defendant's trial counsel and present the statements
to him for inspection. Rather, it was the duty of defendant's
trial counsel to go to the office of the district attorney and
inspect the statements available to him there.
The record shows that defendant's trial counsel did not
perform t~ duty with respect to the handwritten confession.
It shows the following statement by Mr. Turner, the assistant
1Defendant is represented on this appeal by different counsel from that
ill the trial court.
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district attorney: "Mr. Bailin [defendant's trial counsel]
came to my office on perhaps two or three occasions, very
briefly, in connection with this case. Mr. Bailin asked me at
one time to furnish him with copies of the documents which
were not also on tape. I advised Mr. Bailin that my office
did not have the facilities for copying these very lengthy
documents, and made to him the same offer that I had made to
Mr. Hartley [counsel for Sandra Garner], that Mr. Bailin
would bring his Stenorette machine and tape, and I understood
that he also used the Stenorette dictation machine; that I
would furnish him a room and lend him my Stenorette dictation machine, and he could copy all of the statements which
we have.
"This was never done. Mr. Bailin requested that because of
his lack of time that he had been furnished with copies of
those matters which were on tape, that he was asked to furnish
the tapes, the large tapes to be used by the Sheriff's office for
making copies, and I believe he did, and I understood, and I
allege on that basis that because the tapes which he furnished
were not in the best condition, the Sheriff's office made copies
of some of the statements relating to his client on Sheriff's
office tapes which they furnished to him. I do not know, of
my own knowledge, exactly what Mr. Bailin did get copies of,
since I was not present at any of the occasions on which he
received copies. I do know of my own knowledge that he at
no time came to my office and copied anything out of my ine.

".

. . . . . . . . . . . .

" . . . At no time has lIr. Bailin asked me whether he had
copied all of the statements; at no time has he advised me
what statements he did, in fact, have, and at no time has
he asked me whether there were other statements which he
had not seen. Our office has been ready at any and all times
suiting his convenience to permit him to copy any statements
made by his client."
Defendant refers to the fact that at one time Sandra's
counsel asked the district attorney's office for a list of statements, by dates, made by both defendant and Sandra, and
that the list given him contained no reference to any material
of October 5 or October 6, 1959. Actually, the list did refer
to the tape of October 6, 1959. It is evident, however, that
any omisSion ontlle list could not have prejudiced defendant,
since his attorney 11 ad not asked for the list.
[5] No objection was made in the trial court to the introduction in e"idenee of the tape-recorded joint confession on

)
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the ground that defendant's counsel had not been afforded an
opportunity to hear it before the trial, and it is clear from
the record that there is no basis for contending that the tape
was a surprise to defendant's trial counsel.
In the first place, the list which the district attorney's
office furnished counsel for Sandra contained a notation that
a tape was made on October 6 between 3 :30 and 5 :20, and
counsel for Sandra testified that he notified defendant's trial
counsel of the list.
Furthermore, over two weeks before the commencement of
the trial, while counsel were arguing a motion for separate
trials, the assistant district attorney, in support of his argument against separate trials, stated: •• I feel that particularly
in view of the fact that their confessions which I still say are
in aU major points in agreement, in addition to those they
have made one joint confession which they both join in it and
in which they describe what happened.... "
In addition, it appears that defendant's trial counsel actually heard the tape before the trial. During the discussion
which followed the objection of defendant's trial counsel to
the introduction of the handwritten confession, the assistant
district attorney, after relating the failure of defendant's
trial counsel to inspect defendant's written statements, said:
"Mr. Bailin and Mr. Hartley came to the Sheriff's Office, I
am told, on Saturday or Sunday, when I wasn't here, but with
my blessings, of course, and heard a tape recording which is
yet to be offered."
The tape-recorded joint confession was the only tape thereafter introduced in evidence, and, as stated above, when it
was introduced no contention was made that defendant's trial
counsel had not been given an opportunity to hear it in advance of the trial. It seems clear, therefore, that it was the
tape which defendant's trial counsel had heard some time
beforehand.
It should also be noted that defendant's handwritten confession contained the same matter as the joint confession,
which defendant's trial counsel had heard, as appears from
the following statement which he made at the time he objected
to the introduction in evidence of the handwritten confession:
"I do believe, however, as a result of the order of Judge Fogg
[the discovery order] and in all fairness in connection with
this case, that the item which has been marked 48 [defendant's
handwritten confession] Should be suppressed; it is cumuhltive in nature with the other materials that have been pr('-
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sented, and I doubt that it'> I>uppression could hurt his [the
district attol'l1ry '8) case."
It thus apprars that the course pursued did not result in
any prejudicial error to <1ef(>11(1ant.
[6] Fourth: l'hat various confessions of defendant were
ltobtained in return for favors granted or withheld at the
discretion of law enforcemellt officials" and that the trial
court erroneously instructed thc jury 'WitTz respect to the standard by which the vol1mtariness of the confessions was to be
determined.
This contention is not well taken. The record discloses that
each of the eonfessions received in evidence was freely and
voluntaril~' made, without durel>s, inducement, or promise of
reward. (People v. Orooker, 47 Ca1.2d 348, 352 [1] et seq.
[303 P.2d 753] ; People v. Nagle, 25 Ca1.2d 216, 223 et seq.
[153 P.2d 344] ; People v. Grace, 166 Cal.App.2d 68, 71 [2a]
et seq. [332 P.2d 811].)
Rogers 'L'. Richmonil, 365 U. S. 534 [81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.
2d 760], relied Oll by uefC'ndant, is not applicable to the
present case. The defendant in that case was, by a ruse, -1C'0.
to believe that his wife, who suffere(l from arthriti~, was about
to be taken into custody, and he confessed in order to spare her
from being transported to the scene of the questioning.
In reversiIlg the judgment of conviction, the United States
Supreme Court said, at page 741 r4-6) of 81 S.Ct.: "From a
fair reading' of these expressions [the trial ('ourt's instructions
to the jury), we' cannot but conclude that the question whrther
Rogrrs' confessions were admissible into eyidrllCe was answered b~' referf'lIce to a legal standard wllich took into
account the cirrumstance of prohable truth or falsity. Awl
this is not a permissible standard undrr the Due Procrss
Clause of the Fourteellth Amcnllll1cnt. The attention of the
trial judge shonld have bren fo(·uscd, for purpos('s of the Federal Constitution, on tl1e question ",brther tIle behavior of the
State's law enforcement offieials Wil;; 8urh as to overb<.>ar petitioner's will to resht and briJ}g' a bout confc-ssions 110t freel~'
self-determined-a IJuestion to be answered witll complete
disreg-ard of whether or 110t petitioner in faet spoke the truth.
The employment ... of a standard illferted by the bdnsion
of reference~ to probahlc r('liabilit~· rcsulted in a constitutionally inyalid cOllyiction, pursnant to which Rogers is now
detained 'in violation of the Constitution.' "
The instructions in thr prl'srllt Nlsr, on the other hand,
contain no suggestion that the probable reliability of the
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confessions was a factor to be considered in determining their
voluntariness.
Defendant contends that the delay in his arraignment beyond the legally prescribed time, an alleged failure to grant
his request to contact an attorney, and permission given him
to see his wife allegedly with the understanding that he would
make a statement were all factors tending to establish "implied coercion." [7] He then argues that the instruction
given setting out the factors to be considered in determining
whether a confession is involuntary was erroneous in that it
did not cover the subject of implied coercion as such coercion
might be found from any or all of the facts enumerated.
The trial court had instructed the jury as follows: "The
law absolutely forbids you to consider a confession in determining the innocence or guilt of a defendant unless the COllfession was voluntarily made, and although the court has
admitted evidence tending to show that defendant made a
confession, you must disregard the asserted confession entirely
unless you, yourselves, by your own weighing of all the evidence, your own judging of the credibility of witnesses, and
your own reasonable deductions, conclude that the alleged confession not only was made, but was voluntary.
"A confession or an admission is involuntary when it is
obtained by any sort of violence or threats, or by any direct
or implied promises of immunity or benefit, or by allY improper influence which might induce in the mind of the defendant the belief or hope that he would gain or benefit or
be better off by making a statement, and when the defendant
makes such confession or admission as the result of any such
inducement originating with a law enforcement officcr. But,
even though a confession or an admission is made under a hopc
or belief of benefit, it will not be involuntary if such hope
or benefit originated in the mind of the defendant solely, or
was induced solely by the advice or counsel of a relative, attorney, or other person not connected with law enforcement."
Even if we assume that the above instruction would be inadequate if there was evidence that a conft'ssion was given as a
result of "implied coercion" not constituting the type of action
specified by the iustruction as rendering a confession involuntary, this would be of no avail to defendant, as the record
does not support his contention that any such coercion existed.
[2b] As )iereinabove pointed out, the rule is settled in
this state that a pretrial confession giycn during a period of
illegal detention is admissible iii evidence, so far as due process
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is concerned, if it was ,'o]ulltarily made. (Rogers v. Superiol"
Court, supra, 46 Ca1.2d 3, 9 [9] et seq.) [8J As was said in
the Rogers case, at page 10, "The voluntary admission is not
a necessary product of the illegal detention .... " [9] But
even if the earlier confes'iion might have been found involuntary by the jury because of delay in the arraignmpnt, the
record discloses that defendant was arraigllf'd before the committing magistrate on September 22, 1959, and at that time
counsel was appointed to represent him. On October 5 and 6,
1959, he made three confessions, one in the presence of his
wife, and there is nothing in the record that would support a
finding that these confessions were influenced by the earlier
delay in bringing him before a magistrate and appointing
counsel to represent him.
With respect to defendant's alleged requf'st that an attorney
be contacted for him, defendant testified that as Inspector
OxneYad, Liclltcnant Waitc, and he were walldng upstairs
after his interrogation on September ]8 at a substation of the
sheriff's office at Victorville, another officer informed them
that defendant's motlIer (to wl10m a telephone call had been
placed at defendant '8 request) was 011 the telephone. Although defendant was Dot allowed to speak with her, Inspector
Oxnevad told him that he would give her whatf'ver information defendant desired. According to defendant's testimony,
he requested that she be told to have Gladys Root, of Los Angeles, his attorney, come out there. "'~hen asked whether or
not the message was ever communicated to his mother, defendant replied, "My mother said no."
There was DO testimony that Inspector OXllevad told defendant he would not, or did not, relay t11e message, and from
defendant's reply it may be assumed that it was not until he
had contact wit11 his mother at a later date that he learned
his alleged request had not been communicated to her.
Continuing, defendant testified that he told Lieutenants
Keene and Waite at the Victorville substation that he had the
cards of two attorneys and asked that Mrs. Root be called, to
whi<:h he l't'ceived the reply, "'Ve will do that later." He then
testified: "After 'Vaite talked to me upstairs ... about five or
10 miuutes there at the 0001', I told him, 'All right, I will
make a' statement.'" Defeudant's willingness to confess so
shortl~' after receivillg, as he put it, "a stall" on his request
that Mrs. Root be called hardly shows that he was coerced into
giving tIle confessioll as a result of the officers' alleged actions.
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[10] With respect to defendant's contention that he was
coerced into giving his handwritten confession by a promise
made by thc sheriff that he could haven visit with his wife
if he gave the statement, the sheriff denied making any su(~h
agreement.
_
Defendant, however, testified that on October 5 he scnt for
the sheriff, told him that he would tell the truth and he wanted
to see his ,vife, and reminded the sheriff that the latter haa
promised in Victorville that he could have a visit with his
wife. Defendant then testified: "He [the sheriff] said, 'Write
the statement and I will let you see your wife.' I said, 'I want
to see my wife.' I said, 'This statement, here, is started and I
will finish it, but I want to see my wife.' He said, 'You go
ahead back to the cell and fiuish it.' And he told the jailer
I had that pad and pen, so he would know, and then I went
back to the segregation unit and lay down on my bunk and
tossed the pad on the floor along with the pen. He came back
a couple of hours later and asked me if I was finished and I
said, 'No, you ean take the pad back if you want, but I want
to visit my wife.' He said, 'In the morning. You go ahead
and write it and I will let you visit your wife.' After chow
in the morning they got me out of my cell and took me to the
back and I had an hour and 20 minute visit with my wife. "
Thus, it will be seen that even under defendant's w'rsioll
of what occurred the sheriff agreed only that defendant could
see his wife after he finished the statement. However, defendant was allo'wed to see her before finishing it, and it was four
hours after his conference with his wife had ended before he
completed the lengthy statement and gave it to the sheriff.
This falls far sllOrt of proof that defendant gave the swtement
in return for permission to see his wife.
[11] The eourt also instructed the jury as follows: "The
faet that a defendant was under arrest at the time he made a
confession or an admission or that he was not at the time
represented b~- eounsel or that he was not told that any statement he might make could or would be used agaiust him or
that he was told that others cad made statements implicatillg
him in the cl'ime, WillllOt render such confession or admission
involuntary.' ,
Defendant ("onteJ1us that ~ven though this instruction was
proper in itself, the court erred hy not further instructing the
jury that thes0 factors might be considered together with other
evidence bearing 011 the voluntarilwss of Qefendallt's confession. Such an instruction, however, would be relevallt only
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wh{'n there is evidence showing the>ie factors to be part of an
ovcrall pattern of coercion or other improper influencc, an(l,
as hereinabove pointed out, the record does not support dcfendant's contention that any such com'eion or influence
existed.
[12] Fifth: That the admission into evidence of conf(!ssions made by dcfenda.nt after his arraignmcnt or i1HUctm(mf,
outside the presence of /tis counscl, was a deni{]l of the ri!Jht
to counsel a1!d a violation of the dne process clause of the
Fourtccnth Amendment.
There is no merit to tiJis contcntion. The absence of a
defendant's counsel at the time he freely and voluntarily
makes a confession, without threats, force, duress, or promise'
of reward, do('s not of its('lf r{,lldrr the confession inadmissible
and in violation of the due proeess clause of the federal Constitution. (State of Oregon v. Kt'isticlt, 226 Ore. 240 [3j!)
P.2d 1]06, 1110 ct SCf].] ; d. RogtT's Y. Supcri01' Co'urt, 46 Ca1.
2d 3, 10 [11] et sef]. [291 P.2d 929].)
Vve concur with the statement of Mr. Justice Sloan in Stale
of O"c!Jon v. 1{"isiich, S11P1"O, at page 1110 [359 P.2d] : "Wt'
think eaeh case must be examined to determine if a failure'
to provide or to permit an accused to consult counsel in existence would have violateil constitutional rights or otherwise
impaired the voluntary character of an admission. Therefore,
we must consider the facts in this case."
The record discloses that Oll Octoher 5, 1959, the r-:lle}"iff
reccived a 110te from his jailer that defendant wished to l';p('ak
with him. Pursuant to this rerlnest, the sheriff visited dcfrnoant at the jail, at whieh time l1e!'elldant stateil that he ,'.'on]d
tell 11im the truth regarding the killings. Afte'l' making a
confession orall~', dC'fcndant agTcrrl to write it in his OWI~
handwriting. Defenilullt hcg3n writing, Imt thrll ref]u('stcll
permission to go to his cell and take his time to complete it.
Latcr tllat eYclling the sheriff vi~ited defendant in his cell
and asked him if he had finisheu bis confession. Def{'ndl1ut
replied that hr was tirc(l and that he would finish it in the
morning.
The next day at 7 :30 a. m. thc sheriff asl,ed def('ndant, in
effect, if 11(' llad fini:,hed the writtrll confession. Defemlmlt
replird tllnt he llad 110t. Tile shl'l'iff then told him he ,,"oul(l
pick it up lnt('r.
At 7 :4G a. 111. Sandra was bronght to a room in the jail,
and defcl1dant wa:~ prfmitt.ed to talk with her there for an
hour and twenty minutes.
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At 12 noon the granu jury returned the indictment under
which defendant was tried. 2
About 1 p. m. the sheriff again asked defendant if he had
finished the statement. Defendant replied that he had about
one page more to write, and he then completed it in the presence of the sheriff. At the sheriff's request, he read the
statement aloud and then handed it to the sheri1f. Defendant
had dated the statement October 5, 1959.
The sheriff asked defendant if lIe would be willing to make
flle same statement in the presence of Sandra, and defendant
said that he would.
Later that afternoon Sandra was brought to the llomicide
office, where the sheri1f read parts of defendant's statement
to her. He asked her if it was the truth and told her defendand had given him the statement. To this Sandra replied that
she would have to hear defendant say it.
Defendant was then brought to the homicide office. The
sh£'ri1f again read part of his statement to Sandra and asked
defendant if he had not written it. Defendant replied in the
affirmative and, turning to Sandra, said, "We might as well
tell the truth."
At 3 :30 p. m., within five or ten minutes of the time defendant had entered the room, the making of a tape recording wa.c;
begun.
The tape shows fllat Lieutenant Keene first made a few
preliminary remarks to record who was pr£'sent and then
stated: "We have brought both of you down here to the
Homicide Division, and we understand that you arc willing to
t('11 us exactly what occurred on Satul'day niglJt, Septemb:=-r
the 5th, and early Sunday morning, S<'ptembcr th~ 6th, at the
time that Richard L. Nowlen, known as Rick Nowlen, and
Patl'icia Hurley Skene, known as Pat, how they met their
death, and who is respollsiblf'. Are you willing, the two of you,
to relate the facts to us, as to exactly what occurred on that
Saturday evening and early Sunday morning'"
Both defendant and Sandra answered in the affirmative and
acknowledged that the statements they were about to make
\\'('re free and voluntary and were being made without an~'
})romises of reward or immunity of any kind. They them ga,-e
their accoUl\ts of the crimes, with som(' iuterl'ogation by Li(,llten8nt Keene from time to time l'(':raT~iug details.
In support of llis conh>IIHon tlwt llis constitntional rigl)t~
"It will he recalled thnt <1"rl'udunt llll\l !IreD nrrnigncd 011 Sl'lltcmlJcr
22, 1959, under the informnl ion originally lik<1 ng~illst him.
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were violated by the taking of the confessions outside the
'presence of his attorney, defendant relies on two recent New
York cases, People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544 [166 N.E.2d 825],
decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, and People v.
Waterman, 12 App.Div.2d 84 [208 N.Y.S.2d 596], decided
by the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, and
directs our attention to the concurring opinions in Spano v.
New York, 360 U. S. 315, 324 et seq. [79 S.Ot. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d
1265].
[13] Those cases, however, are distinguishable from the
instant case, and none of them stands for the proposition that
where, as here, a defendant who has been apprehended and
charged with a crime volunteers to make a confession, and he
does so, outside the presence of his nttorney, with no persistent
grueling on the part of interrogating officers, his constitutional
rights have been violated.
In Spano v. New York, supra, the defendant, after indictment for first-degree murder, retained counsel and surrendered
through the instrumentality of his attorney, who advised him
not to make any statements. He was subjected to persistent
and continuous all-night questioning for almost eight hours
by an assistant prosecutor and numerous police officers, including a personal friend who was a fledgling policeman and
importuned him to confess. He finally did confess, after having
repeatedly requested, and been denied, an opportunity to consult his attorney.
It was held that on tIle record in that case the defendant's
will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue, and sympathy
falsely aroused and that therefore the confession was not
freely and voluntarily made and its admission into evidence
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The majority specifically declined to rule on the defendant's
contention that following indictment no confession obtained
in the absence of counsel can be used without violating the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The concurring opinions discuss the latter question. It is
clear, however, that what is there condemned is the obtaining
of a confession as a result of the persistent grueling of a
defendant iv secret after he has asked for his. attorney and
his request has been denied.
The confession in the Spano case was given after hours of
persistent grueling by law en'forcemcnt officials, during which
the defendant had steadfastly refused to answer, and unquestionably resulted from the grueling. In th~ present case, OD
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hand, the confessions were not mnde as a result of

allY grueling of d<>fendant.

J

[14] As ])(~rrtofore pointed ont, defendant had sent won1
to tIle sheriff that llC wanted to sec him, and upon the sheriff's
arrival voluntarily gaye what he t11en insisted was n true
account of the crimes. Clearly this confession was not the
result of any grurling of defendant.
The same thing is true of defendant's lHmdwrittt'll eonf(·ssion. Writtcll for tIle most part while he was alone in IllS
cell, it im-olved no interrog-atioll of an~' ]18ture.
There was son1(' interrogation of defelldnl1t and Sandra at
the time they maile their joint oral stah'ment later that nft.<'rnoon; but ill the Y(~ry hq;illl1illg' of tIle interview tlH.'y haf1
indicated their willingnc:·;s to t<:>l1 exaC'tly ,,-hat Illtrl occurred
with respect to the killing~, ana hy 110 stretrh of the imagination can it be said tlmt sl1(·h iJltrl'l'ogatioY; eonstituted grueling
which resulted in d<:>frlldal1t's confessing his guilt.
Futhermore, at 110 time did drfelldant rcqurst an opportunity to consult his attorl'ry, as the defrndant in the Spano
ease had.
In People v. Di Biasi, supra, as in the Spano case, the drfendant, after indictment for nmrdt'r, had retained cOUllse)
and had voluntarily surrendered through the instrull1cntalit~·
of his attorney. Subsequently he wa" qu"stioned by several
policr offieers and an assistant district attorney ill the absence
of l1is own attorney and made rertain dam:1gil1g' admissions.
It is clear that the defrndant had not reqursted the interview
or exprrs:oed any desire to mal,e a statement.
In the present case def('ndant (lid not voluntarily surrender
but was apprehended, and he JUld expre~sed a desire for an
interview and an opportunity to make a stntement.
In People v. 'Watcrman, s1rpro, the defendant had been apprehended, but, unlike the present case, he had not solicited
the present'e of the law enforeemcllt offil'iaJ to whom he made
his confession or expres:::ecl any drsire to mal;:(' a statement.
Shortl~- after halH1ing dowll it" dr(·ision in People 1'. Di
Biasi, SlIP1'a, the Court of Appeals of Nmy York de('idrd the
case of PwpZe v. Do II' l1S, 8 N.Y.2(1 860 [168 N.E.2d 710]. III
that (·ase t}]e defClH:ant Jwd not sWTc:l·.lf'rrcl. a~ t]1(' df'frlHlnllt
in thr Di Binsi case had, bnt had hf'('n Hpprch(,lHled after l1is
indi(·tlllrllt. He then gayp sta tt'll1""j s 10 the l1l'1'C'!':ting offieel',
two deteetiyes who 1180 gOlie to Flol'i,1a to take him into eustod~·. and the pros,>cntor. AlthoufYh r.ll tlw"r statements wrre
received in evidcm'e, the jutlgment of "olryidioll was affirm""l.
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This makes it clear that the Court of Appeals had not held in
People v. Di Biasi, supra, as contended by defendant, that a
clefendant has an absolute right to representation by counsel
<luring questioning after indictment.
The views we have expressed herein are in accordance with
logic and common sense. If we adopted the rule contended
for by defendant, a guilty man could employ counsel, surTt'nder himself, and then freely and voluntarily, outside the
presence of his counsel, without threats, force, duress, or
))romise of reward, make a full and complete confession of
having committed a felony, and if he were the only one who
knew the facts, it would be impossible to convict him of the
crime he had committed.
[16] Sixth: That denial· of the right to counsel prior to
the commencement of judicial process is a denial of due
process.
This contention is tlevoid of merit. Section 987 of the Penal
Code reads: "If the defendant appears for arraignment without counsel, he must be informed by the court that it is his
right to have counsel before being arraigned, and must be
asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he desires and is
unable to employ counsel, the court must assign counsel to
defend him." In the present case the trial court complied
with the foregoing provisions of the Penal Code.
[16] Seventh: That prool of collateral crimes tinder the
guise of impeachment may constitute a miscarriage of justice.
The foregoing contention is unsound. Defendant testified
that he was in Korea "fighting for his country in March of
1951." It was defendant's testimony that he had gone to
Korea in February 1951 and been wounded in action in Korea,
and that he did not return to the States until January 21,
1952. On cross-examination defendant was asked if it were
not a fact that in April 1951 he had been arrested by the
Inglewood Police Department. Defendant denied the arrest.
The prosecution established on rebuttal that defendant was
arrested both on April 4, 1951, in Inglewood and on April 5,
1951, in Compton.
Apparently the sole purpose of defendant's testimony concerning his "fighting for his country" was to create a sympathetic background and understanding between himself and
the jury. 'It appears from the transcript that defendant's trial
counsel was attempting to utilize defendant's pxtensive military background in this manner. Under these circumstances it
'vas reasonable that the prosecution be allowed to show a fact
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totally incompatible with the picture defendant's counsel was
attempthlg to draw. Instead of being in Korea as a wounded
veteran, defendant was being booked in two jails in the United
States as a suspected criminal.
[ 17] It would seem that defendant's counsel was satisfied that he had invited such a line of cross-examination, for
he did not object at the trial to the prosecutor's questions.
Defendant may therefore not now for the first time, on appeal,
raise objections to his cross-examination. (People v. Lindscy,
90 Cal.App.2d 558, 567 [16] [203 P.2d 572]; cf. People v.
Westek, 31 Ca1.2d 469,476 [5) et seq. [190 P.2d 9).)
[ 18 ] Eighth: That t7w·c wcrc five instanccs of the exclusion of material evidMlcc on beha.lf of defendant.
An examination of the record discloses that this contention
is without merit. Even assuming that the evidence was improperly excluded, it was not prejudicial error, and under
article VI, section 4112, of thc Constitution any such error
would have to be disregarded by this court.
[19] Ninth: That the trial court erred in s1tstaining an
objection to a qucstion asked Lieutenant Barton KCC11C on
cross-exa,mination as to whether defendant was permitted to
make any telephone caUs from the shC1·ifJ's substation at Victorville to his attot"lICY or his mother after he had bcen returnccZ
to Cal,ifornia.
This contention is also untenable. The court sustained an
objection to such a question, apparently on the ground that
the form and order of the question were improper. However,
the record shows that thereafter Lieutenant Keene, in response to questions of defendant's counsel, testified that defendant did 110t requc:st permission to make a telephone call
and that he (Lt. Keene) was not given a card of an attorney
by the name of Gladys Root and asked by defendant to can her.
It is clear that defendant's counsel was able to develop
whether or not Lieutenant Keene had knowledge of defendant's requests or attempts to make any telephone calls.
[20] Tenth: That an 111latdllOrized person, Mrs. Betty
Crouch, was permitted in the courtroom during the trial, in
t,iolation of an exclusionary order.
This contention is not correct. Mrs. Crouch was called to
the witlle~s stand to testify as to statements she had taken in
her capal'ity as a stenographer in the San Bernardino Sheriff's
office, parti('ularl~- witl} refl'l"t'llce to statements taken from
Sandra on Monda~', Spptember 21, 1959. She was asked to
read the statement from her Hotes, because she was unable to
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from memory. At this time Lieutenant
r('enll('(l f~l' 11. few qu('slions before Mrs. Crouch
commenced to rena he1' t;tatement.
Mrs. Crouell was then recalled to tIle stand, and counsel for
Sandra asked the witness questions on voir dire concerning
the statementil she Jlad tnken from Sandra.
Lieutenant Keel1e was again recalled for vo·i,· di"e examination concerning the taking of statements from lJoth defendant
and Sandra at the re-enactment of the crime at Adelanto on the
morning of Septemhcr 2], 1959.
Lieutenant Keene began testifying at this point, and prosecutor Turncr asked if Mrs. Crouch eould remain in the room.
Counsel for Sandra stated, "I have no objection to her remaining. " Defendant's counsel, who was pr('s(,llt, and the
trial judge made no stntcments at all.
After eounsel finished questioning Lieutenant Keene, Mrs.
Crouch resunwd thc stnnJ und read into the record the interrogation of Sandra. Mrs. Crouch was then cross-examined.
The court then adjoumed at 2 :47 p. m. on :Monday, April 11,
1960.
The next day the court convened at 10 :05 a. m. Sheriff
Frank Bland was called as a witness and proceeded to testify.
The afternoon recess was taken, and the court reconvened in
chambers for argument.
Sheriff Bland was re·called to the stand and testified to
defendant's handwritten confession. After Sheriff Bland was
excused, the prosecution recalled Mrs. Crouch. For the first
time, defendant's trial cOllllsel objectell to her taking the
stand, on the ground that she had been a spectator during
that morning in "iolatioll of the exclusionary order. The trial
judge overruled the objretion.
Mrs. Crouch took the stand and proceC'ded to testify from a
transcript concerning the statements of d('fendant and Sandra
during the re-enactment of thc crime on September 21, 1959.
After the statement was read into evidence, counsel for <1<,fendant asked no questions Oll cross-examination.
Since a motion to exclude witll('sses except the one testifying
is within the discretion of the trial court (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2043), it wa's within thc discretion of the trial judge to
permit Mrs. Crouch to remain in the courtroom as he did.
(People v. PC"sliy, 167 Cal.App.2(1 134, 139 [4] [334 P.2d
219] ; People v. Alaniz, 14.9 Cal.App.2c1 560, 566 [3] [309 P.2d
71] ; People v. White, 100 Ca1.App.2d 836, 838 [1] [224 P.2d
868].)
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[21] It is likewise settled that It court reporter can
properly testify despite the fad that he hac;; been in (~OUI·1.
cOlltrary to all ex(·1usionary ordf'r. (rwplc v. Smitl:. 36 Cal.
2d 444, 447 [3] [224 P.2(1 7]9].) 111 the prer-;cJlt eltSf', nr-; ill
Peoplc v. Smith, SIIJlI'a, 1\1rs. Crou(·h's testimony com;istc(l of
rcauing notes previously rf'eol'(l('d by her. Thercforl" thf're
was no reason to exl'luue her froll1 the courtroom, and uefendant has not llhoWll that lie was prejudiced in any way by
this procedure.
[22] Eleventll: That the jury 'Was not properly instructed.
This contention is without merit. Defendant, without mueh
argument or citation of authority, urges that the trial court
erred in giving some instructiolls and 11O! gidllg othe}'s. Au
examination of the record and the instructiolls giYen indieatcs
that the jury was fully and fairly instructed upon all the
material issues presented to it ani! that 110 prejudicial error
was committed by the trial judgc in instructing the jury.
[23] Twelftll: Thai the dist1'ict attorney C01ilmiticd prcjudicial error in his argument to thc jury 011 thr liclInl/y
hearillg.
During the penalty hparilJg the distrid attorn!')' argued
the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Defendant allcg'es
that under the holding ill People Y. Lou(', 56 Ca1.2d 720 [16
Cal.Rptr. 777, 17 Cal.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2t1 33, 809], a reycrsal
should therefore be had as to th!' penalty heaying.
There is 110 merit to this contention. We hllYe examill('{l tlIP.
argument of the district attorney as it appears in tlle r(>('o1'<1
and have concluded that hi!; c1iseu ... ,;ioll of the deterrent effe(~t
of the death penal(v was olll~' a minor part of his appeal to the
jury for that penalty.
The reference to the detelTrut effect of the death pellaH~'
was therefore not prejudicial (People v. Lane, 56 Ca1.2d 773,
787 [16] [16 Ca1.Rptr. 801, 366 P.2d 57], and under artit'le
VI, section 4 112, of the Constitution must be disregarded.
The judgment is affirmeu.
Schauer, J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
Gibson, O. J., concurred in the judgment.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur,in the judgment, but wish to set
forth my reasons for concluding t.hat defendant was 110t deprived of the right to counsel.
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Defendant was arrested in Arizona 011 September 18, 1959.
On that day, shortly after an alleged failure by the police to
"om ply with his request for counsel, he made two statements
ill response to questioning. 'rhe first included damaging admissions and tIlC second a cOllfession. He made another confession on the following day, and the questions put to him and
11is uns,vers were recorded by a court reporter. On September
21 defendant reenacted the crime for the police. On September
22 he was arraigned, and counsel was appointed for him. He
voluntarily brgan a fourth confession on October 5, but did
not complete and sign it until approximately 1 p. m. 011
October 6. Later that afternoon he and his wife made a joint
confession. The grand jury had returned an indictment
against him on October 6, shortly before he had completed
the fourth confcssion. He contends that the last two confessions were inadmissible on the ground that since they were
taken in the absencc of counsel he was deprived of the right
to counsel.
Defendant inyo};:es the recent decisions of the New York
Court of Appeals in People v. Di Basi, 7 N.Y.2d 544 [166
N.E.2d 825], and Pe01Jle v. Watwman, 9 N.Y.2d 561 (175
N.E.2d 445), which require the exclusion of admittedly voluntary post-indictment confessions on the sole ground that
defendant's counsel was not present whrn defendant made his
statements. (But see State of Oregon v. Kristich, 226 Ore.
240 [359 P.2d 1106, 1111], in which the Oregon Supreme
Court expressly rejected the Di Biasi rule.) The New York
Court of Appeals relied on the concurring opinions of four
Justices of the Ullitrd States Supreme Court in Span.o v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315, 324, 326 [79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265).
Those opinions indicate that at least uuder some circumstances
due process requires thc exclusion of a post-indictment confession made when the defendant's counsel is not present.
In an opinion by the Chief Justice the court reversed the conviction on another ground and expressly refused to decide the
right to counsel issue. The Chief Justice, however, together
with three of the concurring Justices ill the Spano case, had
joined in earlier dissenting opinions to state that a defendant
has a right to counsel immediately after arrest and that
denial of his reqnest for a ,lawyer should result in exclusion
of his confession. (Clv07ocr v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441
[78 S.Ct. 1287,2 hEt1.2tl 1448) ; Ciccllcia v. La.gay, 357 U.S.
504, 511 {78 S.Ct. ] :!!17, 2 L.E<1.2d 1523],)
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The Spano, Di Biasi and Watcrman cases lUust be considered
in some detail, since they present some of tllC practical considerations relevant to the solution of the constitutional problem.
Defendant Spano was indicted for first degree murder.
Altllough he had not then been taken into custody, he surrendered three days later in the company of llis attorney,
who cautioned him not to answer any questions. He underwent substautial interrogation and was dellied his request to
speak to his attorney. Thereafter he confessed. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the jUdgment on the ground
that the confession was involuntary, viewing ab3ence of counsel
as one of various factors relevant to voluntarint'ss. In a concurring opinion Justice Douglas, jo~ned hy Jm:tices Black and
Brennan, stated that in a capital case, 'where the accused was
formally charged and was questioned without eompliance with
his request for counsel's presence, his constitutional rights
were violated as seriously as in Chancllel' Y. Frefa[J, 348 U.S. 3
[75 S.Ot. 1, 99 L.Ed. 4], in which t11e trial court had denied
a continuance to allow defendant to obtain coul1sel. Justice
Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, emphasized
the distinction between "questioning a suspect in the course
of investigating an unsolved crime" and questioning n man
who has formally been accused by indietnwnt, stating, "the
absence of counsel when this confession was elicited was alone
enougl1 to render it inadmissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Our Constitution guarantees the assistance of
counsel to a man on trial for his life in an orderly courtroom,
presided over by a judge, open to the public, and protected by
all the procedural saft'guards of the law. Surely a Const.itution wllich promises that mnch can youchsafe no less to the
saUle Dlan under midnight inquisition in the squad room of a
police station."
In the capital case involving Di Biasi the deft'ndant was
likewise not taken into custody until after the indictment.
He llad been hiding for some six and a half ~'ears, but surrendered on the advice of his attorner. There was no showinl!, howe~('r, that he requested the attorllt'~· 's presence before
making his responses to interrogation. In snmmarizing the
('oncnrrin~ opinions in Spano v. N (10 r ork nnd applying tl1em
to tIle ca!'e, the New York Court of AppC'nls laid down the rule
that "after indictmellt tltc right of all accllsu] to fl,c a,~sistallcc
of an attorncy is a,bsoluic and tllnt I!UC'stiOllill~ l1im after indictment in the absence of his at1ol'll(,~' is a violation of his
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right to counsel." (166 N.E.2d at p. 828.) (Italics added.)
The statements made by Di Biasi were therefore inadmissible,
and the judgment was reversed.
This holding was extended in People v. Waterman to a noncapital case in which the accused had no counsel. The defendant was apprchcnded immediately after the crime and made
two voluntary statemcnt.c; during interrogation after indictment. They were excluded because "lVaterman was without
c01l11sel at the time of the alleged confession. He was not
asked . . . if he had retained 01' been assigned counsel. The
fact that defendant Waterman was without counsel at the
time of the questioning, when he was known to the interrogator
to be an accused, should not deprive him of the benefit of the
principle announced in People v, Di Biasi. . , ." (208 N.Y.S.
2d at p. 598.) (Italics added.) The decision was affirmed and
its reasoning approved by the Court of Appeals. (9 N.Y.2d
561 [175 N.E.2d 445].)
In the foregoing cases, the confessions were obtained during
police interrogation after indictment. In the present case
there was no interrogation during or immediately preceding
the fourth confession and relatively little interrogation during
the making of the joint confession. Under People v. Di Biasi,
however, exclusion does not turn on the extent of the interrogation. After indictment a defendant is entitled to counsel's
advice at any time he is talking to the authorities. The Di Biasi
rule would therefore seem to require exclusion of Garner's
fourth confession as well as the one made jointly with his
wife.
People v. Downs, 8 N.Y.2d 860 [168 N.E.2d 710], would
not compel a different conclusion. There ",as no opinion in the
Downs case. As the New York Court of Appeals has noted,
however, "The Downs decision turned on the special circumstances there present. Thus, Downs was explicitly advised that
he was not required to make any statements and that he could
consult an attorney; his first confession was aetually volunteered before any questions were put to him; and at the trial
he gave testimony on direct examination in his own defense,
as forecast by his counsel in his opening to the jury, which
was virtually identical with the statemcnts he made to the
authorities before triaL" (People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d at
pp. 448-449; see Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interroga.tion:
The Right to Oounsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 Brooklyn L. Rey. 24, 55-57.)
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The language jn the New York ('ases and in the concurring
opinions in Spo/no v. N cu: York indicates a concern to strike
Ii balance "between the competing interest of society in the
protection of cherished individual rights, on the one hand,
and in effective law enforcement and investigation of crime,
on the other." (People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d at p. 447.)
The balance was struck by attempting to draw a line between
neutral inquiry by thc police aimed at discovering tIle facts
of the crime and interrogation of a perSOll suspected of COInmitting the crime. It is a formalistic assumption that indictment is the point when a defcmlant particularly needs the
advice and protection of counse1. l Often a defendant is
arrested under highly suspicious circumstances and from the
time he is apprehended his guilt is a foregone conclusion in
the minds of the police. Frequently too, suspicion falls upon
him at some intermediate point before indictment. In some
cases the evidence against the accused may be stronger at the
moment of arrest than it may be in other cases when the
indictment is returned. It is hardly realistic to assume that
a defendant is less in need of counsel an hour before indictment than he is an hour after. If the neutral inquiry-suspicion
distinction is to be read into the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it would be preferable to do so forthrightly as in the English Judge's Rules. (Set forth in Devlin,
The Criminal Prosecution in England, 137.)
The Judge's Rules provide: "1) When a police officer
is endeayoring to discover the author of a crimc, there is no
objection to his putting questions in respect thereof to any
person or persons, whether suspected or not, from whom he
thinks that useful information can be obtained.
"2) Whenever a police officer has made up his mind to
charge a person with a crime, he should first caution such
person before asking any questions or any further questions,
as the case may be.
"3) Persons in custody should not be questioned without
the usual caution being first administered."
A Home Office Circular of 1930 stated: "Rule 3 was never
illtended to authorize the qUt'stiOlling or cross-examination
'The distinction hctwcen formal accusation and preliminary investi·
gntion has also been used in other cont.exts to ju~tify requiring or deny·
ing presence of counsel. (See e.g., In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 [77 B.Ct.
:'10, 1 L.Ed.2d 376); BOlt'les '". Bacl', 142 F.2d 78i; United States v.
Let1ine, 127 F.Supp. 651; Bights of Witnesses in .lfdmini.sfrative Intll)s,
tigations, 54 Harv.L.Rev. 1214; cf. Hanna11 v. J,al'c1I(', 363 U.S. 420
11'0 S.Ct. 1;'02, ] ;;14·1,j~(1, 4 L.Ed.::d HOi J.)
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of n }lrrson ill l:lls10<1y aftrr liP lJIIs !;(,(~ll l'alltillurd, 011 nil!
snhj<·\·j of the ('1·i1llP 1'01' "llieh he is ill tl1stody .. , ," Police

llppnrt llrc from thr nllles may in thc tliscrrtioll of the trial
rrsult ill t'xduding the confpssion. (Devlin, op. cit .
.~1I1)ra, at p. 42.) A dC',·hioll 10 exclude dr}1ell<1s 011 all the
facts in the case. (Se<' Rcyi11a v. Ba~s [1953] 1 Q.B. 680, 684;
Reyillo v. ,~f7'offell (1952] 2 Q.B. 911, !Jl4; Rex v. Voi.sill
1]9]8] 1 K.B. 531, 588; Re.yifla v. Wofiam, 36 Crim. App. Rep.
72, 7i; Rf'x \'. GI'oII-SOn, 16 Crim. App. R<,p. 7, 8.) "[W]hell('WI' the <,,-idel1ce in t1l(' poss<'ssioll of the police has beeomt'
suffi('iC'utly wei~ht:.. to justify a c]large, the cllarge is for this
purpose treated as having been made and the suspect is thercafter treated as the aeeus<,d." (Dcvlin, op. cit. SlIpl'a at
p. 35.) The polie{' are 11<'Jd to all ohj{'ctive standard in delermillilJ~ when the {'vidence has b;>eome sufficient to justify a
chargr. 2 (ld. at p. 36.)
It is urged in support of tlj(~ Di Biasi rule that once the
indictment is brought, the trial has in effect begun. (See
People v. Walel'n/rlll, 175 N.E.2d at pp. 447-448.) It ",ouM
be jU8t as reasonah]C', howe"c1', to view tlle judicial proc{'Ss as
beginning at somt' 01 her time 8>; after arrt~st or after arraignment.
In any evcnt t]lcre arC' srrions obj<·etiollS to reading into
t1Je Fourteenth Amen(lmellt. the nl'utral inquiry-suspicion
(1i;;tinction. "It ma~' s{'em stl'll11ge [to the police] that they
"llOUld he supposed 110t to ask que:4ioll!': of th<' 011e person
who is ('<'HtraI to t11<' investigation." (Williams, QuesHoniny
by tile Police: Some P"octicol Oonsideratiolls [1960] Crim.
hRey. 325, 340.) Althol1:rh qtH'"tiolling mn~' sometinll's be
nn easy substitute for ~('i(,lltific poliel' work, it is also Oft{,ll

jl1!l~:('

.. , In prllctiee. ,,'llnt happens is this. The police officer in the witness
Lox is giyen c\'idenee of II stah'lllPllt ma,1e hy the neruRcd before enution.
lIe COIllt'S to a part of it ",hie)1 ~oun8e1 for the defense wishes to keel)
out if he ean; if ('OUIlSl'1 thin)(s it :lIl argun hle point, be will object Oll
the ground that before the int'I'iminnting pnrt "'as reached, the aecuscc1
mIght to haye be('n ('autioned, for, he ,,-ill 8ny, by this 8tnge 8urely the
]:olice officer lIIlISt hnye mnde liP iliA Jllind t(l eh:ll'ge tIle nceused. Counsel
~'(lr the defense iR then nlIowt'd to ero,g'exnllline 111(' police oflker to
(oot:; blisll, if he ean, thnt there nrc good p:roun<1s for his objection, the
of-,p('r's nnrmth'(' of e\"it1('nl'e hcillg for this purpose interrupted. If the
(·"iul'nee whidl tll(, I·olice hnd up to tillS l'oint was ~~rong :lDd e1earh'
l'oint('d to the accused, the offic('r will find it difficult to mnintnin under
eross·exnminntioll thnt he IIml not yet madc up his lIIind to chnrge the
ntC·lIsed. In ]lra"'ic~. till' jUl1ge tcnds to mnl,(' his own assessment of th('
('"U,'Jl('c: an<l if hI' thinks it strong cllougll, he will not put much vnlllc
011 l1~s('rtions hy th" poli('c offi{'cr thnt. he was st.ill in doubt." (Devlin,
"p. c-i1. supra at ]ll'.3::i·36.)
57 C.3d--6
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('ssential to the solution of a ('rimc' and the conviction of tlle
guilty. There may be no witnesses otller than the accused,
or the witnesses may be dead or unavailable. Thus, as Justice
Frankfurter stated in Culombe v. C01111ecticut, 367 U.S. 568
[81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037] : "Despite modern advance.<;
in the technology of crime detection, offcnses frequently occur
about which things cannot be made to speak. And where there
cannot be fouud innocent human witnesses to such offenses,
nothing remains-if police investigation is not to be balked
before it has fairly begun-but. to seck out possibly guilty
witnesses and ask them questiom;, witncs.<;(·s, that is, who are
suspected of knowing somethillg about the offense precisely
because they arc suspected of implication in it.
"The questions which these suspected witnesses are asked
may serve to clear them. They may serve, directly or indirectly, to lead the police to other suspects than the persons
questioned. Or they may become tlle means by which the
persons questioned are themselves made to furnish proofs
whieh will eventually selld them to prison or death." (ld. at
p. 1040 [6 L.Ed.2d ] ; Sec Wails v. 111(1ial1a, 338 U.S. 49, 57-62
[69 S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801] (concurring opinion).) Although at on~ time English courts excluded confessions
obtained in violation of the Rules, tlley apparently do not do
so now, and police qnestioning has become quite common.
"Perhaps the truth is that the Rules have been abandoned,
by tacit eonsent, just because they are an Ullreasonable restriction upon the activities of the police in bringing criminals
to book.'· (Williams, op. cit. supra, at p. 332; see Confessions
and Police Detention, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
Oll Constitutiollal Rights of the Committee on the JUdiciary,
S~llat(', 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 [Statement of Professor Harry
Strret, University of Manchester]; ct. Cic.c1lcia v. La.gay,
357 V.S. 504, 509 [78 S.Ct. 1297, 2 L.Ed.2d 1523].) The
Home Secretary's circular of 1930, quoted abow, is a "dead
letter." (Williams, op. cit. supra, at p. 330; see Barth, The
Price of Liberty 64-65; see generally, Rcgilla Y. Bass (1953]
1 Q.B. 680, 684; Regina Y. St1'ajJel1 [1952] 2 Q.B. 911, 914.)
TIl£' perpetrator of a crime is normal1y the one 'rho knows
most about it, and his eonfession, yolunta l"ily made, is often
the -best eddence of hi~ guilt that can be obtained. (See
Commomvea.7th v. Dillon, 4 Dull. (UJ:U 116, 117 [1 L.Ed.
765]; Commonwealth v. Agostoll, 364 Pa. 464 [72 A.2d 575,
:;83] ; People v. Vallcflltti. 297 N.Y. 226 [78 N.E.2d 485, 488] ;
JIaley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 614 [68 S.Ct. 302,92 L.Ed. 224]
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[dissenting opinion].) Only overwhelming social policies can
justify the exclusion of such vital evidence. In the case of
(~oerced confessions, the evidence may be unreliable; even if
reliable, a free society cannot condone police methods that
outrage the rights and dignity of a person whether they
indude physicnl brutality or psychological coercion. (See
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-321 [79 8. Ct. 1202,
3 L.Ed.2d 1265] ; Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 109.) When a
confession is voluntary, however, courts are reluctant to exclude it. "Interrogation per se is not, while violence per se
is, an outlaw." (Ashcraft v. Te71nessec, 322 U.S. 143, 160
[64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192] [dissenting opinion]; sec
Lyons v. Oklahoma" 322 U.S. 596, 601 [64 8.Ct. 1208, 88 L.Ed
1481] j Lisenba v. California" 314 U.S. 219, 239-241 [62 S.Ct.
280, 86 L.Ed. 166J.)
As many commentators and courts have recognized, therc
is a "compUlsion to confess" to crime. Wigmore states the
point colorfully: "'fhe nervous pressure of guilt is enormous;
the load of the deed done is heavy; the fear of detection fills
the consciousness; and when detection comes, the pressure is
relieved j and the deep sense of relief makes confession a
satisfaction. At that moment, he will tell all, and tell it truly.
To forbid soliciting bim, to seek to prevent this relief, is to
:fly in the face of human nature." (Wigmore on Evidence,
3d ed. § 851 at p. 319; see, e.g., CO'Ynmonwealth v. Agoston,
364 Pa. 464 [72 A.2d 575,581,583].) A psychiatrist explains
the phenomenon of confessions in terms of subconscious but
overpowering guilt feelings and desire for punishment. "There
is ...an impulse growing more and more intense suddenly to
cry out his secret in the street before all people, or in milder
cases, to confide it at least to one person, to free himself from
the terrible burden. The work of confession is thus that emotional process in which the social and psychological significance
of the crime becomes preconscious and in which all powers
that resist the compulsion to confess are conquered."8 (Reik,
The Compulsion to Confess, p. 267.)
ane continues: I' The whole emotional expenditure in confession in
mnny eases weighs only little compared witll the work of confession, that
painful performance in which something has to be overcome and as
little as the punislJwent weighs compared with the suffering that origi·
nates in the superego. No earthly judgment will attain the strictne~~
of the superego in many penons. Describing the work of confession in
the expressions of ego·foetol's, it can be ('onccin'd of as the effort tllat.
IJUcceeda in having the superego n1l0w the ego tile benefit of confession.
'I'he masochistic pleasure of suffl'ring :md of torture through the super-
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So long as the methods used comply with duc process standards, it is in the public int<.>rcst for the police to encourage
confessions and admissions during intcrrogation.· (See
C1tlombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 {81 S.Ct. 1860,6 L.Ed.
2d 1037, 1040 n. 2, 1044 n. 17] ; State v.Smith, 32 N.J. 501,
534 [161 A.2d 520] ; Commonwealth v. Agoston, 364 Pa. 464
[72 A.2d 575, 581] ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 614 [68 S.Ct.
302,92 L.Ed. 224] [dissenting opinion].)
It may be argu<.>d that if the Di Biasi rule is adopted, the
poliee will still have time to interrogate and encourage confessions before an indictment is returned or an information
filed. In some cases, however, as ill Spano v. New York and in
People v. Di Biasi, an indictment may be returned in advance
of the dcfendant's apprehension. In sueh cases there could
be no interrogation of the suspect at all, except in the presencc
of his attorney. Moreover, if tIle suspect is in custody before
indictment, the police could easily frustrate the rule by delaying the indictment or the information. TllUs, the rule would
operate only occasiollal1y and arbitrarily. Again, it is never
certain when the suspect will be in the proper frame of mind
to confess. The psychological struggle between a guilty person's conscious desire to protect himself and his subconscious
guilt feelings may not be resolved in favor of confession until
some time after the crime. (See Reik, op. cit. stlpra at p. 266.)
Concededly, a rule that thc poliee allow counsel to be present
during questioning of a person either after his arrest, as
suggested in the dissellting opinion in Crooke!' v. California
and Ciccllcia v. Lagay, s'upra, or after suspicion has focused
upon him would greatly aid in protecting him from llis own
folly and from IllS ignorance of the law. (See Memorandulll
on the Detention of Arrested Persons and their Production
Before a Committing Magistrate in Cllafre<.>, Documents on
Fundamental Human Rights, Pamphlet 2 (1951-1952), p. 541.)
It would also discourage police mistreatment of persons in
ego, during the periotl in which the work of confession tnl!:esplace, can
easily be recognized afterwards. The work of confession itself affords
a partial gratification of tllQtmasochistie need for punishment. Only
in this way-through the preceding 8uffering- docs it become under·
standable thnt the criminal, with little nnxi('ly, a"'ait8 tile real punish.
ment nfter the conf(>Rsion." (1 d. at p. 268.)
"Questioning Buspe('ts has be(>n declare.1 ~ I jndi~Jl('n!!Rble iA Iftw enforc('·
m('nt" (People v. Ha7l, 413 J1J. 6]:;, 624 (llO N.E.2d 249, 254], quoted
in ClIlomllt V. Connecticut, 6 L.E<l.2t1 at I'. 1044). It is noteworthy that.
ou retrial, "'llen his volnntary adll1is~ions W('Te ('xclmlNl from evid(>nce,
})j Biasi was acquitted. (Sec New York World·Telegram and Sun, )[nreh
2,1961,1).13 col. 1; 61 Coluill.I..Rev. ';'48 n. 32.)
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iUllction, hmn'wl', would hardly he

('ollfill('J to preventing the third degrN' ana explaining to the
Lt'l'U!;('d the legal siguifi('(iI1ce of the qUC'stiOllS posed. Rath('r,

in

words of Mr .•Justi(!e Jackson, "To bring in a lawyer
areal peril tosoll1tiol1 of the crime, because, ul)dcr
unr adversary s~'stClll, he decms that llis sole duty is to pro1('I't IJis client-'-guil1.y or in11ocent-ano that in such a capacity
he owes no duty whatever to help Rociety solV<' its ('rim(' In'oblem. Under this conception oi criminal procedure, any lawyer
worth bis fial~ will tell the suspect iu 110 uJJ('('rtain terms to
mal,e no stat!'ment to police under any <;irl:um;;tallce~."
l Watts v. II/diana, 338 U.S. at Pi 59 [dissenting opinion] ;
Commonwcalth v. Agosto'lt, 364 Pa. 464 [72 A.2d 575, 583] ;
l:::tatc v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 470 [73 A.2d 249] ; Williams, op. cit.
supra at p. 344.)
R.ecognition of a defendant's right toco118u1t with counsel
nt the pretrial stages of the criminal action does not signify
11,at counsel must be prC'scllt during interrogation. In California, a defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel (Pen.
Code, § 686, subel. 2). Moreover, "aiter .•• arrest, any attorney ••. may at the request of the prisoner or any relative
of such prisoner, visit the person so arrested." (Pen. Coue,
§ 825.) Willful prevention of consultation with an attorney
makes an officer guilty of a misdt'meanor and liable in a ch'il
lwtion for damages. (Ibid.) Before arraignment, an impe\~llnious defendant is cntitled to appointment of assigned
(·ounsel or of a public defender. (P('n. Code, §987; Go,'. Code,
§§ 27700-2i711.) Tb('se codc sl,ctions, <1l'signed to assure a
defendant efi't'ctiw r~presl'ntation b:- COUlISC'l, do not preclude
(l~lestioning him Whl'll Ilis coullsl'l is not prcs(;'1)t.
The indigent dcf('ndant post's a!lother prublem under the Di
Bia.si rule, particularly in jurisdictiol1s that are less libl'ral
than California ill providing eoullsl'l at public expense. Giving
un accused who has the llll'llllS nnll foresight to retain an attorney (fr('l}uently the "professional criminal") a right 10
\'ounsel's pl'esC'llce dnrillg interrogntion, would widen the gulf
hctween tllC rights of a ]wrSOIl with and one without counsel.
(Pcople v. Di Bi.(l.si, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 552 [l6G N.E.2d 825] [disI-wnting opinion] ; SPI' 36 N.Y.P.h R.'Y. 73i, 741-742.) A defendant W]1O has obtaillC'd 111(' artyj(,(, of counsel would be
less in neC'd of the protl'l'tion ofl'"rl'\l hy the Di B:'asi rule than
";ould tbt' indigC'nt de~(']](l:1llt. To avoid this elL,crimination
11t!' N!'w York courts 1\(>1<1 11lat an inrligC'llt d('f!'nllant must bc
V'oyjdrtl \'()U11Sel befort' a pn,! - hill itt l1lC'ut intN'l'ogation can
tllC

lU('fillS

